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The nature of near-death-experiences (NDEs) is largely unknown but recent evidence
suggests the intriguing possibility that NDEs may refer to actually “perceived,” and stored,
experiences (although not necessarily in relation to the external physical world). We
adopted an integrated approach involving a hypnosis-based clinical protocol to improve
recall and decrease memory inaccuracy together with electroencephalography (EEG)
recording in order to investigate the characteristics of NDE memories and their neural
markers compared to memories of both real and imagined events. We included 10
participants with NDEs, defined by the Greyson NDE scale, and 10 control subjects
without NDE. Memories were assessed using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire.
Our hypnosis-based protocol increased the amount of details in the recall of all kind
of memories considered (NDE, real, and imagined events). Findings showed that NDE
memories were similar to real memories in terms of detail richness, self-referential,
and emotional information. Moreover, NDE memories were significantly different from
memories of imagined events. The pattern of EEG results indicated that real memory recall
was positively associated with two memory-related frequency bands, i.e., high alpha and
gamma. NDE memories were linked with theta band, a well-known marker of episodic
memory. The recall of NDE memories was also related to delta band, which indexes
processes such as the recollection of the past, as well as trance states, hallucinations,
and other related portals to transpersonal experience. It is notable that the EEG pattern of
correlations for NDE memory recall differed from the pattern for memories of imagined
events. In conclusion, our findings suggest that, at a phenomenological level, NDE
memories cannot be considered equivalent to imagined memories, and at a neural level,
NDE memories are stored as episodic memories of events experienced in a peculiar state
of consciousness.
Keywords: NDE, near-death-experience, hypnosis, memory, EEG, integrative effort, clinical psychology,
psychophysiology
INTRODUCTION
Near-death-experience (NDE) is classically described as an
intense psychological experience of debated nature, characterized
by an atypical state of consciousness occurring during an episode
of apparent unconsciousness and usually in life-threatening con-
ditions (Moody, 1975; Greyson and Stevenson, 1980). The inter-
est in this phenomenon is well-founded when considering its
incidence, ranging from 10% (Greyson, 2003) to about 35%
(Zingrone and Alvarado, 2009) in individuals who have been
close to death—and its across-the-board nature such that NDE
reports in different cultures are substantially similar indepen-
dently of sociological, demographic, and psychological variables
(Kellehear, 2009). It is notable that there is evidence of NDEs in
very young children as well (Sutherland, 2009).
In a referential review, Agrillo (2011) outlined the most recur-
ring features reported in the literature that characterize NDEs,
namely (a) awareness of being dead; (b) increase ofmood in terms
of euphoria, happiness, and well-being; (c) out-of-body experi-
ence; (d) entering a tunnel-like structure; (e) perception of a light;
(f) perception of heavenly or hellish landscape; (g) encounter
with deceased relatives, religious figures, or beings of light; (h)
experience of a life review; (i) different temporal perception; and
(j) perception of sounds or music. These features are included
in the NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) currently considered the gold
standard to identify veridical NDEs.
An additional facet of this phenomenon, that needs to be men-
tioned, is that even if a NDE usually occurs in circumstances
of closeness to death, the literature describes many reports of
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individuals that have had a NDE without being physically in dan-
ger. A NDE can also be experienced during depression, isolation,
meditation (Owens et al., 1990; van Lommel, 2010, 2011), psy-
chological critical life events (Facco and Agrillo, 2012), or it may
occur in healthy individuals present during a close relative’s death
(Moody and Perry, 2010).
Moody’s first modern report about NDE, which contains 150
narratives, is entitled “Life after life” (Moody, 1975). This title is
illustrative of the challenge, from both scientific and philosoph-
ical points of view, represented by NDE as one of the most fas-
cinating issues in cognitive neuroscience research (Agrillo, 2011).
In this context, two theoretical frameworks are aimed at interpret-
ing this phenomenon: the so-called “biological/psychological”
and the “survivalist” hypotheses (Braithwaite, 2008). The for-
mer theory suggests that NDEs are a consequence of brain
functional changes that usually, but not always, occurs during
the dying process and/or a psychological response to the per-
ceived threat of death, such as cerebral hypoxia (Blackmore and
Troscianko, 1988), cerebral anoxia (Lempert et al., 1994), hyper-
carbia (Klemenc-Ketis et al., 2010), serotonin (Morse et al., 1989)
or noradrenaline (Mobbs andWatt, 2011) release alteration, mas-
sive liberation of glutamate (Jansen, 1989) or endorphins (Sotelo
et al., 1995). In this vein, a referential article by Blanke et al. (2004)
reported, for instance, that a typical feature of NDE, i.e., the out-
of-body experience, is underpinned by a neural dysfunction, and
can occur in neurological patients where the occurrence of a dis-
integration between personal (vestibular) space and extrapersonal
(visual) space is conceivable. The latter theory advances supposi-
tions toward a separation between mind and body, postulating a
persistence of some sort of “soul” after the body’s death. Among
the survivalist interpretations, the theory of continuity proposes
that memories, self-identity, and cognition, with emotions, con-
tinue to function independently from the unconscious body (van
Lommel, 2011; Bókkon et al., 2013).
The numerous reports of NDEs in the absence of life-
threatening conditions encourage an extensive, large-scale effort
in NDE rendering, that goes beyond the reductionist interpreta-
tion that consider NDEs as consequences of dying brain biological
mechanisms. One of the most critical aspects that could lead to
a further step in understanding such a complex phenomenon
is related to NDE’s mnesic encoding, storage, and recall. In his
review, van Lommel (2011) highlighted some core issues arising
from NDE, including “why is the experience of the self dur-
ing NDE so real? How is it possible to experience enhanced
consciousness with the possibility of veridical perception inde-
pendently of the lifeless body?” (p. 20). NDE memories are
characterized by a sense of “phenomenological certainty” of the
experience, typical of the perception during daily life (Dell’Olio,
2010). In this vein, Potts (2002) reported that NDEs have been
described by individuals as perceived as “real” or even “realer than
real.”
In a recent study, Thonnard et al. (2013) examined this
aspect of NDEs in depth. The authors specifically investigated
NDE memories with the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire
(MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988), built to evaluate peculiar charac-
teristics of real and imagined event memories (Johnson et al.,
1988). They compared memories of real and imagined past events
in three groups of individuals that survived from the coma, one
of which was characterized as having had NDEs and a control
group. In summary, Thonnard et al. (2013) reported that NDE
memories have more features than any kind of memory of real
and imagined events, or memories related to a period of totally
unconscious state such as coma. According to their interpreta-
tion, these findings demonstrate that NDEs cannot be considered
as imagined events at all. Moreover, the authors highlighted that
NDE memories seem to be unique and unrivaled.
Given the theoretical relevance of these premises, we were
inspired by Thonnard et al. (2013)’s study. Our purpose was to
investigate the features of NDE memories both at psychological
and electrophysiological levels, in a group of NDE experiencers
(NDErs), compared to a matched control group of individu-
als who never experienced a NDE. In contrast to the study of
Thonnard et al. (2013), to achieve our aims we used a hypnotic-
based protocol devised to facilitate the richness and thoroughness
of the recalls. Such a method, rooted in psychodynamic tradition,
is considered an excellent aid to facilitate and to focus on the recall
of any kind of memory, both real and imagined (Erdelyi, 1994;
Orne et al., 1996; Scoboria et al., 2002; Wagstaff et al., 2004).
Particularly worthwhile for our purposes, hypnosis has already
been successfully used in clinical practice, as reported in the liter-
ature, to evoke memories of NDEs that have happened previously.
It was reported that some individuals were able to remember their
NDEs only under hypnosis (Schroeter-Kunhardt, 1993; Facco,
2012).
From a psychological perspective, our first objective was to
further characterize the NDE memories at the phenomenological
level. We analyzed and compared NDE memories with memories
of real and imagined events, in a group of NDErs and in a control
group. Memory characteristics were assessed using MCQ before
(to obtain a common baseline) and after the hypnotic procedure.
In accordance with Thonnard et al. (2013), we expected that NDE
memories would show similar features to those of real events, and
different to those of imagined events.
From an electrophysiological perspective, our hypnosis-based
recall approach was implemented by recording the electroen-
cephalographic signals of participants. Electroencephalography
(EEG) was chosen as an eligible means to measure neural activ-
ity associated with the nature and/or distinctiveness of the NDE
memories, when compared to both real and imagined memories.
Among the number of advantages that it brings, EEG offered the
possibility to explore the neural correlates in a non-invasive way.
It permitted a setting where the hypnotist could remain beside the
participant during the administration of the hypnotic protocol.
We were particularly interested in examining whether the sub-
jectively perceived peculiarity/vividness of NDE memories had
a neural counterpart. Moreover, we were interested in uncov-
ering a specific marker of NDE memories, in line with NDErs’
peculiar phenomenological reports. We expected to observe more
commonalities between real and NDE memories compared to
memories of imagined events. Of particular interest for the
present investigation, were those EEG frequency bands labeled
theta, alpha (principally the faster frequencies within this band,
i.e., high alpha or upper alpha), and gamma, because several EEG
studies linked them, among other cognitive processes, to mnesic
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operations (Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2003; Jensen et al., 2007;
Klimesch, 2012). Cortical theta band oscillations, in the range
of 4–7Hz, observed at frontal, temporal and posterior regions
of the scalp have been linked to retrieval in memory paradigms
(Burgess and Gruzelier, 2000; Klimesch et al., 2001). Alpha band
oscillations, in the range of 7.5–13Hz, represent the dominant
frequency at rest and they mostly originate from the occipital
lobe. Klimesch (2012) argued that high alpha band desynchro-
nization primarily reflects controlled access to/retrieval from the
knowledge system, including not only long-termmemory but also
procedural and implicit-perceptual knowledge. Within this theo-
retical framework, it was suggested that the retrieval of seman-
tically well-integrated information elicits more cortical excitation
(i.e., alpha-band desynchronization or decrement of alpha power)
than less integrated information. In conclusion, gamma band
oscillations (above 30Hz) also seem related to memory pro-
cesses. In paradigms exploring long-term memory, it has been
shown that gamma activity at the encoding predicts successful
memory performance (Sederberg et al., 2003) and at retrieval,
gamma activity was stronger for familiar words correctly recog-
nized as having been previously presented than for new words
that were correctly rejected as not having been previously pre-
sented (Osipova et al., 2006). It is notably that Sederberg et al.
(2003) proposed that gamma activity may represent a marker of
true memories; thus, during memory recall enhanced “gamma
activity” may reflect the reactivation of “synaptically encoded
representations” (Jensen et al., 2007) or, in other terms, the reac-
tivation of the neural circuit originally recruited during encoding
(Slotnick and Schacter, 2004).
Studies investigating EEG markers of hypnosis have produced
mixed results so far (Oakley, 2008; Cardeña et al., 2013), indicat-
ing high alpha (MacLeod-Morgan and Lack, 1982), theta (Graffin
et al., 1995), and gamma (Cardeña et al., 2013) as potential indices
of hypnosis or hypnotic susceptibility. Because our purpose was
not to focus on exploring the nature of hypnosis in itself and its
neural correlates and because all the critical comparisons we were
interested in were between types of memory (retrieved under
hypnosis), we decided to focus our analyses on EEG recorded
during hypnosis.
In the light of such premises, we expected that silent free recall
of (at least) real memories would have been associated with theta,
high alpha and/or gamma band power.
We also hypothesized a relationship between the amounts of
additional memory details reported after hypnosis and the power
of these frequencies. As discussed above, because high alpha band
desyncronization is linked to memory processing, we expected to
observe a negative correlation between high alpha band power
and the difference score in the amount of detail of the real
memories after hypnosis. In contrast, a positive correlation was
predicted between theta and gamma band power and the differ-
ence score for these memories, as suggested by existing evidence.
The most intriguing question, however, was whether a similar
relation would have been observed also for NDE memories in the
experimental group as well. If these memories have characteristics
similar to those of real memories and involve the same storage sys-
tems, an analogous relationship between theta, high alpha, and/or
gamma power and the difference score of NDE memories after
hypnosis should be observed. The most appealing issue here was
to uncover whether the subjectively perceived uniqueness of NDE
memories (Thonnard et al., 2013) is associated with qualitatively
comparable but eventually enhanced neural processing or rather
they are qualitatively different from real memories, and more
similar to imagined memories. To better explore this matter we
extended our analyses to the other known EEG band frequencies.
According to our knowledge, neural activation in NDErs has
been described only in two previous studies, one performed dur-
ing sleep state (Britton and Bootzin, 2004) and the other in
a meditative state/control condition (Beauregard et al., 2009).
Therefore, this is the first systematic study that investigates neural
activation during NDE recall and, more in general, the first that
integrates psychodynamic and electrophysiological techniques.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Ten individuals who had self-reported NDEs participated in the
research. These NDErs were reached by using the referral sam-
pling method, often employed in hidden populations which are
difficult for researchers to access (Schroeter-Kunhardt, 1993).
They were recruited through a national association composed
of individuals who had had NDEs or were just interested in the
NDE topic. An advertisement of our research purposes addressed
to those who had experienced a NDE was made available by
means of a social network, where all the association members
were included. Ten of them were reached by phone in order to
participate in the study. They were seven females and three males
and their mean age was 49.0 years (SD = 6.8).
Their NDE was experienced in four of them by a traumatic
injury followed by loss of consciousness; three of them reached
NDE during a coma state caused by severe medical condition (for
example sepsis); two of them had a NDE without any threat-
ening condition (i.e., isolation or existential crisis). NDErs were
compared with a 10-subjects control group without NDE.
The control group included 10 volunteer healthy subjects
(seven females, mean age = 48.2 years, SD = 6.9), matched
by gender, age, and educational level with the experimental
group.
The first exclusion criterion for all participants was to not
report the history of psychiatric, neurological, or substance use
disorders and to not take any psychotropic drug at the time
of the experimental procedure. The second exclusion criterion
was the absence of personality disorders. All participants under-
went two in-depth clinical interviews, far-between 1 week. In
the first clinical interview, an experienced clinical psychologist
administered the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis
II Disorder (SCID-II; First et al., 1997) to both groups of partic-
ipants in order to exclude individuals with personality disorders
from the research. In the second clinical interview, two expert psy-
chotherapists investigated through a non-structured interview the
presence of personality disorders in order to exclude particularly,
subclinical psychotic/schyzotypical traits or dissociative aspects.
The only inclusion criterion was related to the experimental
group of NDErs. They completed the NDE Scale, a self-rated,
16-item, multiple-choice questionnaire developed to assess these
experiences (Greyson, 1983). All of them obtained a score of seven
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or above, which is generally used as a criterion for considering an
experience to be a NDE (Greyson, 1983). The mean NDE score
was 16.5 (SD = 5.7, range = 7–24). In general, all of the partici-
pants met the aforementioned criteria to be considered as eligible
to participate in the research. Overall, our study included the par-
ticipation of 20 subjects, divided into two groups, NDErs and
their matched controls.
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Padova
University (protocol No. 1321). Written informed consent was
obtained from all individuals who participated in the study.
MEASURES
Characteristics of memories
To assess the participants’ characteristics of memories, we used
the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988), in a modified version adapted by
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) and used by Thonnard
et al. (2013). This MCQ version included 15 items assessing
several memory characteristics such as sensory details, memory
clarity, self-referential and emotional information, reactivation
frequency, and confidence in their ownmemory (Thonnard et al.,
2013). An MCQ total score was derived summing all the 15 items
(each on a 1–7 points Likert scale).
EEG acquisition and analyses
When populations of neurons simultaneously fire (i.e., synchro-
nization), their rhythmic input is reflected in the extracellu-
lar field potential as brain oscillations. Spectral analyses allow
decomposing the recorded EEG data by Fast Fourier transform
(FFT) into component frequencies. It is largely established that
power estimates of each component frequency reflect the number
of neural units synchronously active.
EEG activity was continuously recorded under hypnosis dur-
ing silent free recall of memory conditions. All participants were
comfortably seated with their eyes closed. The EEG was recorded
from 32 active electrodes placed on an elastic Acti-Cap posi-
tioned over the scalp in accordance with an extension of the
international 10/20 system and referenced to the left earlobe.
Horizontal EOG (HEOG) was bipolarly recorded from electrodes
laterally positioned on the outer canthi of both eyes. Vertical
EOG (VEOG) was recorded bipolarly from two electrodes, one
above (Fp1) and one below the left eye. The impedance was kept
less than 10K. EEG, HEOG, and VEOG activities were ampli-
fied (pass band 0.1–100Hz) and digitized at a sampling rate of
1000Hz.
EEG was analyzed offline using the Brain Vision Analyzer
Software (version 2.0, Brain Products, Munich, Germany). EEG
was digitally bandpass filtered (0.5–44Hz, slope: 24 dB/octave)
and re-referenced offline to the average of the left and right ear-
lobes. The filtered and re-referenced EEG was further processed
by using an independent component analysis (ICA). We used an
ICA-based artifact correction in order to separate and remove
VEOG and HEOG artifacts from EEG data by linear decom-
position. Components contaminated with eye movements were
corrected. EEG was further visually scanned by two indepen-
dent observers to identify other artifact contamination including
muscle artifacts and rejected. Following this procedure data from
three participants (two from the experimental group and one
from the control group) were excluded from successive analyses
because of excessive muscle artifacts. The EEG was segmented
into 2000ms epochs.
For each participant, the artifact-free EEG was then subjected
to FFT by averaging over each 2-s epoch using a Hanning window
to normalize the spectrum analysis. Spectral power was com-
puted for the following frequency bands: delta (2–3Hz), theta
(3.5–6Hz), low alpha (7.5–9.45Hz), mid alpha (9.5–10.45Hz),
high alpha (10.5–12Hz), beta (14–25Hz), and gamma (32–
44Hz).
PROCEDURE
A week before the experimental procedure, all the participants
underwent a clinical interview with an experienced clinical psy-
chologist who administered the SCID-II (First et al., 1997) and
NDE participants also completed the NDE scale (Greyson, 1983).
These measures were collected to exclude the participants with a
score on the NDE scale of lower than seven (Greyson, 1983) or
those on which, due to physical or mental health issues, hypno-
sis could have been potentially harmful. Furthermore, following
Holden and MacHovec (1993)’s guidelines, the interview was
aimed at excluding participants with negative and/or stressful
NDE experiences. None of the participants were excluded by these
means.
Right before the experimental procedure, we exhaustively
described the research methodology, carefully avoiding to expli-
cate the researcher’s hypotheses or expectations, and all partici-
pants confirmed their agreement. Two trained psychotherapists
interviewed participants according to a psychodynamic-oriented
approach to confirm their psychological well-being and, mainly,
to exclude the presence of psychotic symptoms or high state anx-
iety levels, according to Holden and MacHovec (1993)’s guide-
lines. Moreover, the interview was finalized to build a favorable
alliance between participants and researchers.
During the experimental procedure we asked participants to
recall two distinct memory conditions, in two subsequent ses-
sions, in turn divided in two phases.
The two memories conditions were real events memories and
target memories. In detail, in the real events memories condition,
participants were asked to recall and narrate the most positive
emotionally salient real event memory. In the target memories
condition, the NDE group was asked to recall their NDE mem-
ory and the control group an imagined event memory (i.e.,
past dreams, fantasy, or unfulfilled intentions). Participants were
invited to match emotional value and personal importance of real
memories with target memories.
The first session of the experimental procedure began with a
“pre-hypnotic” phase, where subjects were asked to recall the real
memory event in a wakeful state, and then to describe it with
as much detail as possible. In the second phase, labeled “post-
hypnotic” phase, participants were asked to recall the same event
after a hypnotic session aimed to enhance richness and thorough-
ness of memories (Erdelyi, 1994; Scoboria et al., 2002; Wagstaff
et al., 2004). At the end of each phase, both “pre-hypnotic” and
“post-hypnotic”memories were assessed withMCQ (Jensen et al.,
2007; Thonnard et al., 2013).
After the first session, participants were invited to rest for
about 15min and then they were asked to complete an easy
visuospatial task, in order to divert their own attention.
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Subsequently, in the second session, we repeated the same
sequence of “pre-hypnotic” and “post-hypnotic” phases, asking
participants to recall target memories.
Real and target memories order was counterbalanced within
subjects and between NDE and control groups.
The hypnotic protocol had the same structure in both sessions
and was inspired by the protocol used by Palmieri et al. (2012).
A trained operator in Eriksonian hypnosis induced a hypnotic
state in the participants through a standardized ideomotor gen-
eral induction, followed by instructions and suggestive symbolic
imagery aimed to aid the recall process, including safeguards to
avoid a shift from recalling to regressing. When the participants
achieved a satisfying hypnotic trance, they were instructed to
focus on the memory for 8min. Further, participants were gently
led back to full wakefulness by means of a de-hypnotization pro-
cess and they were asked to describe the contents of the memory
again. All hypnotic procedure was inspired by a psychodynamic,
Eriksonian approach to hypnosis. Alongside the whole hypnotic
session, encompassing induction and suggestion processes, EEG
activity was recorded.
At the end of the second session, the hypnotist operator
concluded the protocol according to Holden and MacHovec
(1993)’s guidelines for the risk management in hypnotic recall
of NDE. This safety procedure included a brief conclusive inter-
view and the administration of the Post-Hypnosis Questionnaire
H (Holden and MacHovec, 1993). All the participants in the
present study described the hypnotic experience as pleasant or
very pleasant (mean pleasantness = 5.9 on a 7-point Likert
item) and did not feel any negative, physical, or emotional
symptom.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Nonparametric tests were used to compare the amount of detail
of memories (MCQ) between experimental and control groups
and within different recall conditions. Nonparametric statistical
methods were preferred to other parametric statistics because
they require few if any assumptions about the shapes of the
underlying population distributions and are more robust with
small sample size (Siegel and Castellan, 1988; Kitchen, 2009). We
used Mann-Whitney U test for between-group comparisons and
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for within-group ones. For all analy-
ses, 2-tailed p-values of less than 0.05 were considered significant.
All analyses were done with SPSS version 18.0.
EEG statistical analyses were conducted on an individual mean
value of the spectral power within each frequency band at a sub-
set of pooled electrode sites, resulting in the following regions:
frontal (F3/F4), central (C3/C4), parietal (P3/P4), temporal
(T7/T8), and occipital (O1/O2). In all multi-factorial analyses
(see “EEG spectral power analyses and results”), a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used where appropriate, i.e., when spheric-
ity assumption was violated (Greenhouse and Geisser, 1959).
RESULTS
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMORIES IN PRE-HYPNOTIC PHASE
Firstly, we computed the internal consistency of MCQ total score,
which resulted in satisfactory scores (Cronbach’s alpha of MCQ
total score = 0.786).
In order to replicate and extend Thonnard et al. (2013)’s
results, we compared MCQ total scores of different memories in
the pre-hypnotic phase, considered as a baseline, with the Mann–
Whitney U nonparametric between-groups test. Real memories
of participants with NDE did not differ from real memories of
the control group (U = 37.5, Z = −0.947, p = 0.362), whereas
target memories were marginally greater in the experimental
group than in the control group (NDEs vs. imagined memories;
U = 26.0, Z = −1.817, p = 0.069). In other words, as expected,
NDE memories were characterized by a greater amount of detail
and richness compared to imagined recalls. In other words, as
expected, NDE memories had more characteristics of memories
than imagined recalls.
Within-group comparisons with Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
showed that in the NDE group there were no significant dif-
ferences between NDEs and real memories in the pre-hypnotic
phase (Wilcoxon Z = −1.023, p = 0.330). In the control group,
real memories were significantly greater than imagined memories
(Wilcoxon Z = −2.041, p = 0.043). Taken together, these results
suggest that in the pre-hypnotic phase, the recall of NDE mem-
ories and real memories had the same amount of detail and that
both were more complex than imagined memories (Figure 1).
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMORIES IN THE POST-HYPNOTIC PHASE
The effect of the hypnosis on the characteristics of memories
was verified in all experimental conditions (real memories vs.
target memories, i.e., NDEs and imagined memories), compar-
ing MCQ total scores collected during the recalls in pre-hypnotic
phase with post-hypnotic ones. Hypnosis had a significant effect
on memories in all conditions; the amount of detail increased sig-
nificantly in NDE memories (Wilcoxon Z = −2.606, p = 0.006),
imagined memories (Wilcoxon Z = −2.403, p = 0.016), and real
memories in both groups (Wilcoxon Z = −2.809, p = 0.002).
Moreover, to further understand the effect of hypnosis, we ana-
lyzed the difference score (i.e.,  MCQ) of memory character-
istics after hypnosis in all conditions of recall. The difference
score was slightly greater in the NDE condition compared to
the real condition in the NDE group, but this difference did
not reach the statistical significance (median  MCQ for NDE
memories = 8, median  MCQ real memories = 7; Wilcoxon
Z = −0.767, p = 0.443). The difference score was significantly
lower in the imagined condition than in the real condition
(median  MCQ imagined memories = 4; median  MCQ real
memories = 10; Wilcoxon Z = −1.990, p = 0.047). Comparison
between groups showed no significant differences between NDE
and control groups in the difference score for real memories
(U = 29.0, Z = −1.596, p = 0.111), and target memories (NDE
vs. imagined memories; U = 31.0, Z = −1.441, p = 0.150).
In other words, hypnotic induction proved to be efficacious
in all conditions, significantly increasing the complexity and the
total amount of detail in all kind of memories. However, the dif-
ference score after hypnosis was higher in NDE and real recalls
than in imagined ones.
Consistently with these findings, in the post-hypnotic phase
we found the same differences among memories that we
observed in the pre-hypnotic phase (Figure 1). Real memories did
not differ between groups (U = 31.0, Z = −1.441, p = 0.150)
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FIGURE 1 | Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) total scores for each assessed memory. Median and interquartile ranges are presented
(∗p < 0.05).
whereas there was a significant difference in the target condi-
tion. NDE memories significantly resulted in more complexity
than imagined memories (U = 19.5, Z = −2.308, p = 0.021).
Within-group comparisons showed the same overall picture.
NDE memories did not differ from real memories in the NDE
group (Wilcoxon Z = −1.326, p = 0.185); whereas, at the same
time in the control group, real memories had greater total scores
than imagined ones (Wilcoxon Z = −2.448, p = 0.014).
FACTORIAL STRUCTURE OF MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS
QUESTIONNAIRE
After having replicated and extended the results of Thonnard et al.
(2013), we analyzed the composition of MCQ total score and its
structure in depth to better understand neuronal underpinnings
of specific kind of memories.
The in-depth analysis of the MCQ items led us to question
the adequateness of items 10 and 11 that were on a bipolar scale,
and of item 12 and 14 that were not specifically targeted to the
recall. Having removed these items, an exploratory factor-analysis
led us to hypothesize a four-factor internal structure. We tested
such a model through a confirmatory factorial analysis (CFA).
The results showed that our model had an overall good fit (χ2 =
38.95, df = 28, rmsea= 0.07, cfi= 0.95, srmr= 0.06, nnfi= 0.92,
bic = 2794.93), and fitted our data better than the original with
1 factor composed of 15 items (χ2 = 161.20, df = 86, rmsea =
0.11, cfi = 0.77, srmr = 0.10, nnfi = 0.71, bic = 4230.35).
The identified four factors or subscales of the new models
were: S1] perceptive and cognitive “resolution” (items 2, 8, and
9); S2] “reliving” (items 3, 13); S3] “veracity” (items 4, 5, and
15); and S4] “spatiotemporal organization” (items 5, 6, and 7).
The “resolution” subscale included those items linked to the
clarity and richness of the memory; the “reliving” subscale was
associated with feelings of re-experiencing the event and the orig-
inal emotions; the “veracity” subscale was associated with the
perception of the memory as veridical and the “spatiotemporal
organization” subscale comprised those items associated with the
perception of the memory as a well-organized sequence of events.
The scores were averaged to the number of items in each sub-
scale and they were used in the EEG analyses. Items and subscales
of modified MCQ are presented in Table 1.
EEG POWER SPECTRA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
The mean of the spectral power within each frequency band was
submitted to repeated measure ANOVAs considering region (5
levels: frontal, central, parietal, temporal, and occipital) and con-
dition (NDE/imagined memories vs. real memories) as within-
subjects factors, and group (experimental vs. control partici-
pants) as between-subjects factor. The individual mean values of
the spectral power within each frequency band for each group and
in each memory condition were also correlated (i.e., Pearson’s r)
with the difference score in MCQ after hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ
for NDE memories and  MCQ for real memories for the exper-
imental group; and  MCQ for imagined memories and 
MCQ for real memories for the control group). Furthermore,
to uncover finer relationships between the spectral power within
each frequency band and the difference score after hypnosis, the
 MCQ for each of the four subscales (“resolution,” “reliving,”
“veracity,” and “spatiotemporal organization”) for each group of
participants and for each condition, was also correlated with the
spectral power within each band.
Delta band power (2–3 Hz)
The main effect of region was significant, F(2.396, 12) = 23.46,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.610. Bonferroni-corrected multiple compari-
son post-tests showed that power in the delta band was lower
at temporal region than at all other regions (all ps < 0.001),
and that it was higher at parietal region than occipital region
(p = 0.014). The interaction condition (i.e., NDE/imagined
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Table 1 | Modified version of Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Thonnard et al., 2013).
Item no. Modified version of Memory Characteristics Questionnaire Characteristic (Thonnard
et al., 2013)
Subscale
1 My memory for this event involves visual details: 1 = none,
7 = a lot
Visual details NA
2 My memory for this event involves other sensory details (sounds,
smells, and/or tastes): 1 = none, 7 = a lot
Other sensory details S1] perceptive and cognitive
resolution
3 While remembering the event, I feel as though I am mentally
reliving it: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely
Feeling of re-experiencing S2] reliving
4 I remember the location where the event took place: 1 = not at all
clear, 7 = very clearly
Location S3] veracity
5 I remember the time of the day when the event took place: 1 =
not at all clear, 7 = very clearly
Time S3] veracity
S4] spatiotemporal organization
6 While remembering the event, it comes to me as a coherent story
and not as an isolated scene: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely
Coherence S4] spatiotemporal organization
7 I remember what I did during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very
clearly
One’s own actions S4] spatiotemporal organization
8 I remember what I said during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very
clearly
One’s own words S1] perceptive and cognitive
resolution
9 I remember what I thought during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 =
very clearly
One’s own thoughts S1] perceptive and cognitive
resolution
10 Previous studies have shown that people can report that they can
visualize different memories from different points of view. Using
the bellow mentioned categories, from which point of view do you
see yourself? (A) In your memory, you imagine the scene as an
observer could see it. As an observer, you can see yourself and
other aspects of the situation. (B) In your memory, you imagined
the scene from your own point of view (through you own eyes).
You are an actor. (C) Any of the above mentioned perspectives
described the way you remember the situation. At which point are
you observer or actor in the situation: 1 = totally observer;
7 = totally actor
Visual perspective NA
11 When the event happened, my emotions were: 0 = very negative,
7 = very positive
Valence NA
12 This event is important to me (it involves an important theme or
episode in my life): 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important
Personal importance NA
13 While remembering the event, I feel the emotions I felt when the
event occurred: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely
Feeling emotions S2] reliving
14 Since it occurred, I have thought or talked about this event: 1 =
not at all, 7 = very often
Reactivation frequency NA
15 I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way I
remember it and that I have not imagined or fabricated anything
that did not occur: 1 = 100% imaginary, 7 = 100% real
Real/imagine S3] veracity
memories vs. real memories) × group (i.e., experimental vs.
control participants) was also significant, F(1, 15) = 5.73, p =
0.030, η2p = 0.276. Separate ANOVAs for each group revealed
that power in the delta band tended to be different between
the imagined memories (mean power 1.733μV2) and the real
memories (mean power 1.265μV2) conditions in the control
group, F(1, 8) = 3.89, p = 0.084, η2p = 0.327. For the experimen-
tal group, power in the delta band was positively correlated with
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the total individual scores of additional NDE memories details
recalled following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ for NDE memories)
at frontal region, r = 0.778, p = 0.023, and at temporal region
r = 0.716, p = 0.046. This association was particularly evident
with regard to the “resolution” (at frontal region: r = 0.785,
p = 0.010; at temporal region, r = 0.712, p = 0.024), the “reliv-
ing” (frontal region: r = 0.712, p = 0.018), and “spatiotem-
poral organization” (at all regions; frontal region: r = 0.732,
p = 0.020; central region: r = 0.652, p = 0.040; parietal region:
r = 0.639, p = 0.044; temporal region: r = 0.842, p = 0.004;
occipital region: r = 0.634, p = 0.046) aspects of the NDE
memories.
In the control group, a negative correlation was observed
between the power in the delta band and the total difference score
in imagined memories following hypnosis (i.e., total  MCQ for
imagined memories) at frontal region, r = −0.677, p = 0.045,
and an analogous trend was observed at central and tempo-
ral regions; although, only marginally significant, r = −0.624,
p = 0.072, and r = −0.626, p = 0.071, respectively.
Theta band power (3.5–6 Hz)
The only significant effect was that of region, F(1.992, 12) = 15.35,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.506. Bonferroni-corrected multiple compari-
son post-tests showed that power in the theta band was lower at
temporal regions than at all other regions (all ps < 0.05). Mean
theta band power did not correlate with the total difference score
in MCQ score following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ). However, when
considering separately MCQ subscales, in the experimental group
was observed a positive correlation between the power in the
theta band and the “spatiotemporal organization” aspect of the
NDE memories (frontal region: r = 0.712, p = 0.024; temporal
region: r = 0.614, p = 0.053; an analogous trend, although only
marginally significant, was also observed at central, parietal, and
occipital regions (r = 0.539, p = 0.084; r = 0.547, p = 0.080;
r = 0.513, p = 0.097, respectively). An opposite relationship (i.e.,
negative correlations) was observed in the control group between
the power in the theta band and the “resolution” (frontal region:
r = −0.609, p = 0.041; central region: r = −0.594, p = 0.046;
temporal region, r = −0.640, p = 0.032) and “reliving” (cen-
tral region: r = −0.648, p = 0.029; an analogous trend, although
only marginally significant, was also observed at parietal, tem-
poral, and occipital region: r = −0.568, p = 0.055; r = −0.541,
p = 0.066; r = −0.551, p = 0.062, respectively) of imagined
memories.
Low alpha band power (7.5–9.45 Hz)
Statistical analyses of mean power in the low alpha band did not
show any significant effect (min p = 0.196).Mean low alpha band
power did not correlate with individual scores of the difference
score in MCQ following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ).
Mid alpha band power (9.5–10.45 Hz)
Statistical analyses on mean power in the mid alpha band did
not show any significant effect (min p = 0.491). Mean mid alpha
band power did not correlate with individual scores of difference
score in MCQ following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ).
High alpha band power (10.5–12 Hz)
The main effect of region was significant, F(1.290, 12) = 15.67,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.511. Bonferroni-corrected multiple compari-
son post-tests showed that power in the high alpha band was
higher at occipital and parietal regions compared to the other
regions and lower at temporal and frontal regions compared to
the other regions (max p = 0.016). The main effect of group was
also significant, F(1, 15) = 4.962, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.249, indicating
greater power in the high alpha band in the experimental group
(mean power 4.51μV2) than in the control group (mean power
1.82μV2). The interaction region × group tended to be signif-
icant, F(1.290, 12) = 3.72, p = 0.059, η2p = 0.199, indicating that
the distribution of the high alpha across the scalp tended to be
different in the two groups of participants. Separate ANOVAs for
each group revealed that power in the high alpha band tended
to be lower at parietal region (mean power 2.54μV2) than at
occipital regions (mean power 3.58μV2) in the control group,
p = 0.075.
For the experimental group, power in the high alpha band was
negatively correlated with the total individual scores of the dif-
ference score of real memories following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ
for real memories) at frontal regions, r = −0.713, p = 0.047.
No individual subscales of the  MCQ was particularly linked
with alpha power. For the control group, power in the high
alpha band was negatively correlated with the “reliving” aspect of
the real memories (temporal region: r = −0.603, p = 0.043; and
marginally at frontal region: r = −0.534, p = 0.069).
Beta band power (14–25 Hz)
The main effect of the group was significant F(1, 15) = 6.073,
p = 0.026, η2p = 0.288, indicating greater power in the beta band
in the experimental group (mean power 0.82μV2) than in the
control group (mean power 0.37μV2). Mean beta band power
did not correlate with the individual scores of the difference score
in MCQ following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ).
Gamma band power (32–44 Hz)
The main effect of region was significant, F(1.701, 12) = 3.67,
p = 0.026, η2p = 0.196. Bonferroni-corrected multiple com-
parison post-tests showed that power in the gamma band was
significantly higher at frontal region than at parietal region (p =
0.035). For the control group, power in the gamma band was pos-
itively correlated with the individual scores of the difference score
in MCQ for real memories following hypnosis (i.e.,  MCQ for
real memories) at central regions, r = 0.679, p = 0.022. A finer-
grained analysis considering  MCQ subscales revealed a richer
pattern of results: first, the correlation observed for the con-
trol group was particularly evident for the “resolution” (frontal
region: r = 0.755, p = 0.009; at parietal region, r = 0.817, p =
0.004; at temporal region, r = 0.679, p = 0.022; at occipital
region, r = 0.713, p = 0.016), the “veracity” (at central region:
r = 0.661, p = 0.026), and the “spatiotemporal organization” (at
central region: r = 0.606, p = 0.042) aspects of the real memo-
ries. Furthermore, for the experimental group this finer analysis
revealed a positive correlation between power in the gamma band
and the “reliving” (temporal region: r = 0.728, p = 0.020) aspect
of the real memories.
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Figure 2 shows the scatterplots of the most relevant correla-
tions between memory-related EEG frequency bands (high alpha,
theta, and gamma) and individual  MCQ scores (or subscales
scores) for the real memories and the NDE memories conditions
in the experimental group and for the real memories condition
in the control group. Figure 3 shows the scatterplots of a sub-
set of observed correlations between delta band and individual
 MCQ scores for the NDE memories condition in the exper-
imental group and for the imagined memory condition in the
control group.
Table 2 schematically illustrates the pattern of correlations
between each EEG frequency band considered in the present
study (delta, theta, low alpha, mid alpha, high alpha, beta, and
gamma) and  MCQ scores and subscales scores for each group
of participants (experimental and control groups) and for each
type of memory (Real, NDE, and Imagined).
DISCUSSION
In this study, an integrative effort was employed, from a psy-
chodynamic and electrophysiological perspective, to catch an
in-depth insight into NDE recall. It is notable that this expe-
rience is typically defined by most NDErs as “realer than real”
(Blackmore, 1993; Potts, 2002). To investigate this phenomenon,
we compared NDE memories with the memories of real auto-
biographical events and memories of imagined autobiographical
events, in a group of NDErs and in amatched control group. NDE
memories were verbally recalled both in pre- and post-hypnotic
wakeful state. During hypnosis, the free silent recall was EEG
recorded.
From a psychological point of view, our findings were in accor-
dance with Thonnard et al. (2013), which inspired our theoretical
premises, and with our first hypothesis. Our expectation was to
characterize NDE memories as similar to real memories and as
different from imagined memories in terms of mnesic cues that
can discern one from the other.
In the baseline condition before hypnotic session, NDEmemo-
ries revealed more detail than imagined memories, as investigated
with MCQ questionnaire (Thonnard et al., 2013). Moreover,
according to our hypothesis, in the NDE group there were no
significant differences between NDE and real memories; consis-
tently with these findings, in the control group, MCQ total scores
of real memories were significantly greater than that of imagined
memories. Overall, we found that in the pre-hypnosis phase, the
NDE memories and the real memories had the same amount of
mnesic characteristics and both were more complex and richer
than imagined memories. From a phenomenological perspective,
it could be inferred that NDE memories showed high similarities
with real memories, and profound dissimilarities from imagined
memories. NDErs who participated in our study always consid-
ered their NDE memories far superior to their real memories
from all points of view, despite the efforts of the experimenter to
invite them in finding a comparable event that happened in real
life. All participants who lived NDEs described them as the most
powerful, intense, vivid, important, and founding experience of
their life.
Quotation of a NDE participant to our study: “In 45 years
I dreamed a lot of things, but I never had a ‘dream’ like this.
(. . . ) When you dream, you know that it is a dream. When I
remember my dreams, in the next 5minutes I’m not sure any-
more about their content. This experience (note: NDE) instead,
you’ll remember it clearly, for years.”
Consistently with the literature (Orne et al., 1996; Scoboria
et al., 2002) and with predictions originated by the clinical
practice, all kind of memories revealed amelioration thanks to
hypnotic sessions. In all the experimental conditions (target
memories, i.e., NDE memories and imagined memories, and real
memories), in facts, hypnosis had a significant facilitating effect.
In other terms, the hypnotic procedure significantly increased the
complexity and the total amount of detail of all kind of memories,
as measured with MCQ. Consequently, MCQ score obtained in
the post-hypnotic phase, maintained the same trend and the same
level of significance of the pre-hypnotic phase, revealing that NDE
memories features are totally similar, in terms of sensory, clar-
ity, self-referential information emotional, and confidence of real
memories, and significantly different from more poorly-detailed
imagined events memories.
Findings by Thonnard et al. (2013) also suggested that NDE
memories are actually perceived although, not-lived in the exter-
nal world. The authors concluded their manuscript inviting
neural investigation to deepen the roots of this phenomenon per-
ceived as so veracious: albeit, it happened in an unconscious state.
In this vein, at the neural level, our second hypothesis was to
observe a relationship between recall of real memories and the
power of those band oscillations associated with memory func-
tioning recorded during silent free recall under hypnosis, i.e.,
theta, high alpha, and gamma. Themost critical issue was whether
a relation with these well-known neural indices of memory would
have been observed for NDE memories in the experimental
group as well. Given the reported uniqueness of NDE memo-
ries (Thonnard et al., 2013), we extended our analyses to the
other EEG bands, and the  MCQ for each of the four subscales
derived from the MCQ (i.e., “resolution,” “reliving,” “veracity,”
and “spatiotemporal organization”).
In line with our hypotheses, a better recall of real memories
(both total additional memory details recalled following hyp-
nosis, i.e.,  MCQ for each type of memory, for each group,
and  MCQ for each of the four subscales) was correlated with
a pattern of high alpha power decrease/gamma power increase,
in both experimental and control groups of participants. These
findings correspond well with previous researches showing a link
between these frequency bands and long-term memory perfor-
mance (e.g., Sederberg et al., 2003; Klimesch et al., 2008). It has
been proposed that gamma activity may represent a marker of
true memories (Sederberg et al., 2003). This hypothesis views
gamma activity as an index of the reactivation of the neural cir-
cuits originally recruited during encoding, which usually includes
the occipital regions originally engaged in the encoding of visual
objects and scenes (Slotnick and Schacter, 2004). This relation-
ship between gamma band and real memories also involved the
occipital region. Such a relationship was not observed for NDE
memories (possibly suggesting that they were the result of an
internally generated experience, e.g., hallucination-like form). In
contrast, the increase of theta band power at temporal region pos-
itively correlated with the recall of the details of NDE memories
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FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots of a subset of observed correlations
between memory-related EEG frequency bands (high alpha, theta,
and gamma) and individual  MCQ scores or  MCQ subscales
scores. Scatterplots show the most relevant correlations for the real
memories and the NDE memories conditions in the experimental
group and for the real memories condition in the control group (
S-T org. =  MCQ scores for the spatiotemporal organization
subscale).
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FIGURE 3 | Scatterplots of a subset of observed correlations between
delta band and individual MCQ scores or MCQ subscales scores.
The first two panels show the correlations with the NDE memories condition
in the experimental group and the third panel with the imagined Memories
condition in the control group ( S-T org. =  MCQ scores for the
spatiotemporal organization subscale).
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Table 2 | Pattern of correlations between each EEG band and MCQ scores.
EEG band Experimental group Control group
Real memories NDE memories Real memories Imagined memories
Delta n.s. Positive correlations with 
MCQ (at frontal and temporal
regions); with  MCQ for
resolution (at frontal region)
and with  MCQ for
spatiotemporal organization
(at all regions). rs ranging
from 0.634 to 0.842
n.s. Negative correlations with 
MCQ (at frontal, central, and
temporal regions). rs ranging
from −0.626 to −0.677
Theta n.s. Positive correlations with 
MCQ for spatiotemporal
organization (at all regions). rs
ranging from 0.513 to 0.712
n.s. Negative correlations with 
MCQ for resolution (at
frontal, central, and temporal
regions) and for with  MCQ
for reliving (at central, parietal
temporal and occipital
regions). rs ranging from
−0.541 to −0.648
Low alpha n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Mid alpha n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
High alpha Negative correlations with 
MCQ (at frontal region).
r = −0.713
n.s. Negative correlations with 
MCQ for reliving (at frontal
and temporal regions).
r = −0.603 and r = −0.534,
respectively
n.s.
Beta n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Gamma Positive correlations with 
MCQ for reliving (at temporal
region). r = 0.728
n.s. Positive correlations with 
MCQ (at central region) and
with  MCQ for resolution (at
frontal and parietal regions).
rs ranging from 0.606 to
0.817
n.s.
n.s., no significant.
associated with the perception of the memory as a well-organized
sequence of events (i.e., “spatiotemporal organization” subscale).
Although evidence is not conclusive at present, it is suggested that
cortical theta oscillations are connected to intracranial recorded
hippocampal theta oscillations. Because the critical role of hip-
pocampus in memory functioning is well established (Squire,
2009), it was hypothesized that cortical and hippocampal theta
oscillations dynamically interact, supporting memory operations
(Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2003).
The most recent theoretical scenario supports the notion that
hippocampal theta oscillations are mainly associated with the
temporal organization of episodic memories (Buzsáki andMoser,
2013), indirectly proposing that the retrieval of highly organized
memories in terms of spatiotemporal sequences may also be
linked to an increase in cortical theta power. It is noteworthy that
the observed correlation between the power in the theta band
and the recall of the details of NDE memories associated with the
“spatiotemporal organization” subscale, seems to nicely converge
with this hypothesis. Importantly, in the control group, the power
in the theta band was negatively correlated with additional details
of imagined memories reported following hypnosis, particularly
in relation to those memory details associated with the perception
of clarity and richness (i.e., “resolution” subscale) and the feel-
ing of re-experiencing the event and the original emotions (i.e.,
“reliving” subscale).
In conclusion, the above-described pattern of findings indi-
cated that “successful” recall of real memories was related with
power in the high alpha/gamma bands. Furthermore, NDEmem-
ories were also linked with power in the theta band, a well-known
marker of episodic memory. Moreover, the EEG pattern of cor-
relations for NDE memory recall critically differed from that
observed for imagined memories. As mentioned before, in order
to extensively explore the issue of a neural marker of NDE mem-
ories, we decided to extend analyses to the other EEG bands. Of
particular relevance are the findings relative to delta band oscilla-
tions. Power in this band tended to be different between the real
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memories and the imagined events memories conditions in the
control group, but a comparable power was observed for the real
memories and the NDE memories conditions in the experimen-
tal group. In two recent reviews on delta activity, Knyazev (2012)
and Harmony (2013) indicated a variety of conditions and men-
tal functions associated with delta activity, such as those related to
evolutionarily old basic processes, motivation, reward, as well as
mental concentration. On the basis of extant evidence, one con-
ceivable interpretation of these findings is that the recall of both
real and NDE memories were more rewarding than the recall of
imagined memories.
Furthermore, power in the delta band was positively (and
selectively) correlated with additional details of NDE memo-
ries reported following hypnosis, particularly in relation to those
memory details associated with the perception of the memory as
clear and detailed (i.e., “resolution” subscale), the feeling of re-
experiencing the event and the original emotions (i.e., “reliving”
subscale), and the perception of the memory as a well-organized
sequence of events (i.e., “spatiotemporal organization” subscale).
One explanation of this relationship may refer to the hypothesis
that delta oscillations are also indicative of inhibition of sensory
afferences, a mechanism that will favor internally directed cogni-
tion (i.e., “internal mentation”). This internal mentation includes
a recollection of the past (Harmony, 2013). In these terms, an
increase in delta power may have supported the recollection of
NDE memories. Although reasonable, this interpretation does
not account for a potentially relevant aspect of this finding, i.e.,
the selectivity of the correlation between the power in the delta
band and additional details of NDE memories.
A different and maybe more appealing perspective may relate
to the notion of “state-dependent memory,” also called “state-
dependent learning,” based on which the retrieval of a memory
is facilitated by the match between the original state of con-
sciousness experienced at the encoding and the current state
of consciousness at retrieval (Overton, 1966). To note, the two
perspectives (namely, internal mentation and state-dependent
memory) are not mutually exclusive; however they may integrate
providing a more comprehensive interpretation of this relation
between delta activity and NDE memories. Although evidence is
scarce in this regard and sometimes anecdotal, one may specu-
late that NDE memories were better retrieved when delta power
was greater because during the original NDE, delta dominated
the EEG pattern, or, at least, it was critically associated with the
experience itself. Slow-wave activity has been related to certain
trance states and other related portals to transpersonal experi-
ence (Hartman and Zimberoff, 2002), including the shamanic
state of consciousness, out-of-body experiences, NDEs, and lucid
dreaming. Furthermore, Strubelt and Maas (2008) asserted that
if, during the NDE, neural circuits (including those of the neo-
cortex) usually engaged in memory encoding are functioning, the
experience may be encoded and retrieved later.
As a further argumentation in favor of state-dependent-
memory hypothesis, the hypnotic state has seldom been used to
evoke previously occurring NDEs; some individuals who expe-
rienced this phenomenon were able to remember it only in
hypnosis (Schroeter-Kunhardt, 1993). Facco (2012) underlined
that some common processes could link the hypnotic state with
the NDE experience: both of them have been included in the
so-called “altered state of consciousness.” Facco (2012) stated
that, although NDE and hypnosis are unequivocally two dis-
tinct phenomena, some common processes probably link them.
For example, experiences similar to those of NDE can be easily
generated during hypnosis, such as (a) imagining seeing oneself
from the outside, (b) change in time perception, (c) recalling old
and non-easily accessible memories, and (d) performing a life
review. Holden and MacHovec (1993) quoted a case of a man
submitted to hypnosis, who previously had a NDE during an ana-
phylactic shock. When he recalled it during a hypnosis session,
he replicated the whole experience, including negative physical
changes, in terms of sudden fall of arterial blood pressure with
a great increase of heart rate (up to 190 beats/min), and he re-
entered the normal, physiological state after de-hypnotization.
Therefore, although it can only be regarded as speculation, our
electrophysiological findings fit very well with the hypothesis of
the state-dependent memory, such that an EEG pattern similar to
that originally present during the NDEs may facilitate a recall of
NDE memories.
To summarize the whole pattern of EEG findings, it appears
to unveil a peculiar pattern of neural activity associated with
the recall of NDE memories linked to slow-wave activity, includ-
ing both delta and theta oscillations. Theta power represents a
well-known marker of memory processing, particularly in rela-
tion to episodic memories and their spatiotemporal organization
(Buzsáki and Moser, 2013); delta power has also been associ-
ated with internal mentation including the recollection of the
past (Harmony, 2013). On the other hand, the recall of these
NDE memories did not show any relationship with gamma
power, which has been designated as a marker of true memories
(Sederberg et al., 2003), where “true” indicates that the memory
recall reactivates the sensory circuits originally recruited during
encoding of objects, scenes, events experienced in the physical
world.Whitton et al. (1978) demonstrated that both unmedicated
schizophrenics with Schneiderian criteria during hallucinations
and healthy control participants during a “creativity” test exhib-
ited an EEG frequency pattern of predominantly delta and theta
power. This whole pattern may fit with the proposal of Thonnard
et al. (2013) that NDE memories are hallucination-like memories
of actually perceived hallucinations. In fact, in the present inves-
tigation, NDE recall was related to both delta (recollection of the
past but also trance states and hallucinations) and theta power
(episodic memory) but not with gamma power (true memories;
experienced in the physical world). In synthesis, the EEG find-
ings suggest that NDE memories are episodic memories of events
experienced in a peculiar state of consciousness.
To briefly delineate the intriguing theoretical controversy
between psychological/biological and survivalist theorists in the
matter of NDE memories, it is necessary to begin from the
origin of the debate. In general, it is important to take into
account that, according to well-established classical findings,
memories of human beings originating from real, everyday life,
should have more perceptual information (e.g., color and sound),
more contextual information, and more details than memo-
ries originated from thought (Johnson et al., 1988). Blackmore
(1993) proposed a biological/psychological hypothesis that the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 429 | 13
Palmieri et al. NDE memories
emerging memories of NDE could be totally or partially imag-
ined, as a result of peculiar neuronal pattern of activation and
a reconstructive cognitive process, immediately after the resus-
citation, influenced by personal knowledge and expectations.
Psychological studies from forensic fields have shown that sim-
ple imagining having had a specific experience can create false
memories (Loftus, 2001). In other words, it has been proposed
that reports of NDEs could be memories of totally or partially
imagined events. Survivalist theorists have argued that false mem-
ories are hardly conjugated with rich content information that
characterized NDE. Moreover, it would not be conceivable that
a neural circuit of resource-poor, damaged brain could support
false memory (Parnia et al., 2001). Agrillo (2011) argued that, if
the brain is too unstable to support such processes, the question
would focus on where the NDE memories would be stored. As
Braithwaite (2008) outlined, in order to have any experience to
be remembered, the memory should in the first place encode and
represent the experience.
Finally, our findings seem inconsistent with the idea that such
vivid NDE reports can be originated by totally or partially imag-
ined false memory. In contrast, a suggestive interpretation of our
EEG results appears to contradict the classic idea (van Lommel
et al., 2001) that during a life-threatening event, such as a cardiac
arrest, there is no activity of the cortex and the brainstem (imply-
ing a transient loss of all functions of the brain). A recent study
by Borjigin et al. (2013) was able to reveal brain activity in rats
30 s after a cardiac arrest by using a finer technique, i.e., intracra-
nial EEG recording. This activity was characterized by a transient
surge of synchronous gamma oscillations phase-coupled to both
slow-wave and alpha oscillations, and the authors suggested that
the whole pattern indexed a heightened conscious processing
near-death. However, Greyson et al. (2013), in a subsequent
commentary, raised some criticisms about the interpretation by
Borjigin et al. (2013) of their above mentioned data. Among these
criticisms, the fact that the EEG registered in the rats was a tiny
fraction of the total neuroelectric power present before the cardiac
arrest could be misleading to consider this EEG activity a neu-
ral underpinning of conscious processing. According to Greyson
et al. (2013), it is impossible to establish what, if anything, the
rats were experiencing during the post-arrest period of the surge.
In addition, Borjigin et al. (2013) found that the EEG burst did
not occur in anesthetized rats, whereas NDEs commonly occur in
people who are anesthetized.
Either way, if NDE memory is related to a real event, it should
imply that enough neural activation would be available to encode
and represent the experience and subsequently to report it. As
mentioned above, our results are in line with the hypothesis that
the core components of a NDE have a neural counterpart. If
we assume that some physiological mechanisms can account for
NDEs, then the individual really perceives what was reported later,
albeit not necessarily corresponding to occurring events in the
external, physical world. In a very speculative perspective, NDE
phenomenon could begin some hours, days, even weeks before
the effective exitus, in terms of End of Life Dreams and visions
(ELDVs). The hypothesis of common neural mechanism between
ELDVs and NDEs, where ELDVs phenomenon is a sort of pre-
cursor of NDEs, may not be so implausible. Even if scientific
literature describes ELDVs and NDEs as two distinct phenomena,
a number of common characteristics [i.e., vivid and memorable
visions, encounter with deceased loved ones, feeling of joy and
serenity, transcendence, spiritual transformation after the expe-
rience, Nosek et al. (2014)] make conceivable that they could be
two entities of the same continuum.
Agrillo (2011) labels the psychological/biological and sur-
vivalist interpretations as “in brain” or “out of brain” theories,
respectively, highlighting that survivalist hypothesis do not neces-
sarily exclude the role of biological or psychological components
underlying NDE. According to the author, the crucial point is not
whether “something” can survive after biological death, because
nobody can say anything for sure in this regard, but whether the
NDE phenomenon is explicable at least in terms of brain func-
tioning. In this line, our data supporting the idea of a neural
counterpart of the phenomenon, are not necessarily in contrast
with a more spiritualistic theory. In fact, our findings suggest
a neural support that allowed NDE mnesic storage in a brain
that was partially functional (e.g., in coma patients, or in car-
diac arrest patients), regardless of a flatline EEG, which measures
only surface cortical activity, as suggested by some authors (Bardy,
2002; Braithwaite, 2008; Borjigin et al., 2013) or fully func-
tional (e.g., in isolation condition or meditative state: Owens
et al., 1990; van Lommel, 2010, 2011) at the moment when NDE
happened. In other words, even if the investigation of neural
underpinnings in experiencing or recalling NDE could be roughly
ascribed to a psychological/biological position, uncovering the
neural counterpart of NDE does not exclude per se survivalist
hypothesis. It is likely that many of the arguments reported to
support the former or the latter antipodal positions would be,
in fact, not necessarily mutually exclusive, as in the case of our
findings.
The main limitation of our research is the relatively small
sample size. However, people who experienced NDE classically
represent a hard-to-reach population, because of their reluctance
in talking about their experience to avoid negative reactions in the
others (Schroeter-Kunhardt, 1993; van Lommel, 2011). Further
studies including wider samples are warranted.
In conclusion, our integrative-effort study showed that NDE
memories are different from imagined autobiographical mem-
ories and very similar to memories of real events, in terms of
detail richness, self-referential and emotional information. EEG
signal recorded during hypnotic sessions, successfully employed
to facilitate memory retrieval, revealed a pattern of neural acti-
vation during the NDE recall that seemed to have supported the
retrieval of additional details. Such neural signature was charac-
terized by slow-wave activity, including both theta (i.e., a marker
of memory processing, particularly related to episodic memo-
ries with spatiotemporal organization) and delta (which has also
been associated with internal mentation and meditative state)
oscillations.
Several possible explicative hypotheses, expounded in this
section, could arise from our observations, such as the role
of dependent-state-memory in NDE recall during hypnosis.
Moreover, our impression is that our results could lead to a little,
further step in the direction of an understanding of NDE mem-
ories; although, many questions remain unanswered and further
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research is needed to shed light to this intriguing phenomenon of
consciousness.
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